Affective Politics and Technology Buy-In: A Framework of Social, Political, and Fantasmatic Logics by Pignot, Edouard et al.
 
ISSN 1536-9323 
 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems (2020) 21(4), 901-935 
doi: 10.17705/1jais.00624 
REVIEW & THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
901 
Affective Politics and Technology Buy-In:                            
A Framework of Social, Political, and Fantasmatic Logics 
Edouard Pignot1, Davide Nicolini2, Mark Thompson3 
1University of Münster, Germany, pignot@ercis.de 
2University of Warwick, UK, davide.nicolini@wbs.ac.uk 
3University of Exeter, UK, m.thompson6@exeter.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
We propose a socially informed explanation of technology framing by examining technology “buy-
in”—actors’ relative susceptibility to such framing. We draw on the field of critical social theory to 
introduce the “Logics,” a new framework to the IS discipline that reveals a performative relationship 
between collective framing, power, and affect. The Logics enable us to study buy-in by revealing the 
differing degrees of affective self-identification that underpin and color social practices, showing 
their inherently political nature. We exemplify the affective as well as social politics of buy-in with 
an account of Unity 3D, a market-leading game engine that underwent a major repositioning from 
“fringe” to “mainstream” markets, and discuss four poles of affective positioning with which to 
conceptualize technology buy-in. We conclude by highlighting the consequent need for greater 
political and ethical awareness about the framing of IS and by proposing a framework for 
conceptualizing actors’ orientations toward and thus possible buy-in or resistance to technology 
framing. 
Keywords: Technology Buy-In, Technology Framing, Affective Politics, Discourse, Group 
Dynamics, Game Engine 
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1 Introduction 
In this paper, we argue that affect plays a critical role 
in social processes associated with the design, 
conceptualization, and especially framing of new types 
of information technologies. In so doing, we contribute 
to the rich existing literature on technology framing by 
demonstrating how people’s susceptibility to the 
framing, construction, and manipulation of IS 
discourses and meaning at the group level—already 
well-established in the literature—is mediated and 
conditioned by their own, affective buy-in to such 
discourses. The potential significance of our argument 
for IS researchers is that affect is foregrounded as an 
important medium through which political battles over 
emerging technologies are fought. In this view, 
affectively mediated struggles can influence the 
predominance of one technology over another as 
affective vulnerabilities are exploited through the use of 
targeted discursive strategies intended to encourage or 
discourage buy-in to technology framing. 
In drawing attention to the role of affect in technology 
framing, we connect our argument to existing, well-
established research on the important role of power and 
politics in this process, especially the role of hierarchical 
authority, resource power (control over resources), and 
resistance (Markus & Pfeffer, 1983; Jasperson et al., 
2002). Our own research seeks to contribute to this 
broad field by attending to “meaning power”: a less-
studied area of IS power and politics associated with the 
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construction of meaning (Azad & Faraj 2011) that 
acknowledges the plurality of interests and positions 
involved in making decisions about the meaning and 
design of technology (Faraj et al., 2004; Winner, 1993; 
Glynn, Barr, & Dacin, 2000; Woolgar, Coopmans, & 
Neyland, 2009; Barrett, Heracleous, & Walsham, 2013). 
We enrich the current, predominantly rational and 
cognitive understanding of “meaning power” in 
technology framing by focusing on how these processes 
may be intertwined with affect. In particular, little is 
known in IS research about the linkages between affect 
and the more traditionally studied, rational domain 
(Thompson, 2012), and even less is known about how 
and why actors consent to ideological framing (Pignot, 
2016a, 2016b)—both arguably important gaps in our 
understanding that we seek to address. Our claim is that 
affective processes can render actors more, or less, 
receptive to certain technologies than others, leading to 
buy-in to one frame over other alternatives (Kaplan, 
2008). Our contribution offers an alternative perspective 
from, for example, Barrett et al.’s (2013) discussion of 
framing as a struggle for “cognitive legitimacy or ‘taken-
for-grantedness,’” (p. 205) in which ideologically laden 
discourse has “an essentially cognitive nature” (p. 206), 
as we seek to highlight that affective and prerational, yet 
equally socially embedded processes are also at work in 
shaping which design framing will prevail (see also 
Avgerou & McGrath, 2005). Our paper offers an 
explanation of the mechanisms underlying such 
processes. 
Our explanation builds on existing understandings of 
“psychosocial” dynamics (Fotaki & Kenny, 2014) 
defined as “collective emotions that link [individual] 
behavior and structure, as well as how these dynamics 
shape others, people and systems” (Vince, 2018, p. 15). 
We contribute to and deepen our understanding of these 
dynamics by building on Glynos and Howarth’s (2007, 
2008) poststructuralist theoretical framework of Logics 
of Critical Explanation (hereafter, Logics). In 
illuminating the interplay between affect and political 
identification with discourse, Logics deepens our 
understanding of how unconscious (affective) 
receptiveness, personal vocabularies of interpretation, 
and emotive social performance come to shape social 
reality (Gecas, 2008) by predisposing subjects to either 
accept or contest ideas with which they may be 
confronted. In so doing, Logics enables us to contribute 
to and enrich the recent conversation about 
performativity in IS research (Cecez-Kecmanovic, 
Kautz, & Abrahali, 2014) by showing how subjects’ 
receptiveness to performances such as technology 
framing—and thus the replication, or contestation, of 
associated ideologies, practices, and structures—may be 
enabled or constrained by the interplay between these 
unconscious, biographical, and social dimensions. In 
particular, we extend forward the temporal “window” 
within which performative framing is typically studied 
by showing how performances are located within and 
shaped by preconscious, biographical, and social 
dynamics that may precede as well as continue 
throughout the period of study. In exploring the 
psychosocial linkages between group-level ideologies 
and individual value-identities, we also blur the line 
between “within-groups” and “between-groups” that 
has traditionally characterized studies of technology 
framing. 
Addressing the extensive literature on IS design (e.g., 
Bergman, Lyytinen, & Mark, 2005; Gregor & Jones, 
2007), we have chosen to locate our contribution 
specifically within the subgenre of technology framing, 
because this is the juncture where performances of buy-
in to technological design are empirically visible. For 
space reasons, we therefore refrain from addressing 
other aspects of IS design such as technology 
acceptance, adoption, and implementation (e.g., Zmud 
& Cox, 1979; Swanson, 1988; Davis, 1989; Orlikwoski 
& Gash, 1994; Venkatesh, 2000; Gallivan, 2001; 
Koufaris, 2002; Davidson, 2002; Kaplan, 2008). Our 
focused rather than broad approach builds on the work 
of those who have demonstrated the benefits of 
discussing these phenomena separately (Gondo & 
Amis, 2013; Klein & Sorra, 1996; Lauterbach & 
Mueller, 2014; Pierce & Welbeck, 1977); an in-depth 
discussion of the relationship between these phenomena 
and related literatures lies beyond the scope of this 
article. 
Accordingly, we define “buy-in” as the act of 
identifying with and consenting to the framing that 
characterizes the design of technology. Figure 1 below 
provides a simplified map of the literature that helps to 
position our work and contribution within the existing 
debates. Of course, the relationship between the 
phenomena in Figure 1 is much more complex than 
suggested by our linear flowchart and Figure 1 should 
be read only as a way to clearly position our argument 
and contribution. 
Our investigation of buy-in to performative framing of 
technology addresses the following core question: How 
does affect condition the political dynamics of buy-in to 
technology framing? 
To respond to this question, we build on the Logics 
approach (Glynos & Howarth 2007), a relatively 
underexplored ontological contribution to political and 
social theory, from what is known as the “Essex School” 
of discourse analysis. The Logics approach has made 
some initial inroads into management studies 
(Cederström & Spicer, 2014; Thompson & Willmott; 
2016) but, to our knowledge, it has never been used 
before in IS research. The Logics approach is 
particularly suitable for studying IS, as it is capable of 
foregrounding the affective self-identification that 
underpins social practices as well as disclosing their 
inherently contestable nature. 
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Figure 1. Positioning of the Paper in the IS Literature 
The key argument underpinning the Logics approach 
and our paper is that actors attribute meaning to and 
thus are predisposed toward competing discourses to 
the extent that these framings appeal to forms of self-
identification that are affectively experienced (Glynos 
& Howarth, 2007). In clear terms, how and why both 
specialists and lay users understand and jump on 
conflicting technological bandwagons is determined 
by factors that are neither exclusively rational nor 
exclusively individual and has much to do with 
socially inflected notions of who they think they are or 
who they want to be. The Logics approach both 
exposes and accounts for the links between actors’ 
affective positioning, their receptiveness toward 
framings, and resultant social outcomes; it thus allows 
us to shed light on the ways in which affectivity and 
prevailing discourses affect competing framings of IS. 
The paper proceeds as follows. We first provide an 
overview of where framing and politics have been 
addressed within the IS community and register the 
limited role granted to affect. We connect these 
perspectives to the areas of group motivations and 
affective politics, before introducing the Logics 
approach and examining how this framework can help 
us to reconsider the technology framing process. We 
then illustrate our theorizing with an empirical case 
example showing how the psychosocial dynamics of 
buy-in enable and constrain the technology framing 
process via the case of Unity 3D, a market-leading 
game engine that underwent a major repositioning 
from “fringe” to “mainstream” markets. We conclude 
by discussing the implications of an enhanced 
awareness of affective politics, such as that offered by 
the Logics approach, for enriching existing debate on 
the design, acceptance, and implementation of IS. 
2 Framing, Group Dynamics and 
Affective Politics in IS 
We open with an overview of what we know about 
affective politics in technology framing in order to 
introduce our construct of buy-in. Our main objective 
is to examine why affect has been understudied in IS 
so far: while studies of IT design have acknowledged 
the social embeddedness of framing practices, few 
have actually addressed linkages between 
technological framing, group dynamics, and affect in 
any systematic way (Davidson & Pai, 2004). 
Acknowledging this gap leads us to investigate how 
affect has been studied in IS by attending more 
specifically to the areas of sociopolitical framing of 
technology and group motivations and connecting 
these categories to our central notion of affective 
politics. We streamline in the main text of the literature 
review those theoretical routes that enhance our 
understanding of technology buy-in, such as the Irvine 
School studies on how politics is incorporated into 
meaning-making (Kraemer & Dutton, 1979; Danziger 
et al., 1982), the circuits-of-power approach (Silva & 
Backhouse, 2003), the technology acceptance model 
(Davis, 1989) and the IS literature on 
affects/emotions/feelings (e.g., affective response 
model, Zhang, 2013); we examine these in some detail 
in Appendix A. 
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2.1 Technology Framing as a Political 
and Performative Process 
In this section, we discuss how researchers have 
incorporated the role of politics in the framing of IS 
and then show how acknowledging the socially 
contested nature of design has led to a performative 
focus on how meanings are framed and contested both 
within and between groups. 
Frames refer to “definitions of organizational reality 
that serve as vehicles for understanding and action” 
(Gioia, 1986, p. 50). Orlikowski and Gash (1994) use 
the concept of “technological frame of reference” to 
describe the “assumptions, expectations, and 
knowledge that members use to understand technology 
in organizations” (Orlikowski & Gash, 1994, p. 178). 
Frames apply to a variety of domains, including the 
nature of technology, technology strategy, and 
technology in use (Orlikowski & Gash, 1994), but also 
the capabilities and design of technology, the business 
value of technology, and more (Davidson & Pai, 
2004). In this paper, we focus in particular on the 
framing of the nature of technology that takes place 
when technology design is not yet black boxed and still 
open to debate and controversy (Bijker, Hughes, & 
Pinch, 1987; Faraj et al., 2004). Frames and framing 
are traditionally understood in sociocognitive terms 
(Orlikowski and Gash 1994; Davidson 2002). 
According to Walsh (1995), for example, framing 
results from the application of knowledge structures 
defined as “mental template(s) that individuals impose 
on an information environment to give it form and 
meaning” (p. 281). 
Knowledge structures include frames of reference, 
interpretive schemes, scripts, and other concepts often 
derived from Bandura’s (1986) original notion of 
schemas: template-like cognitive frames that actors use 
to reduce ambiguity in the world. Orlikowski and Gash 
(1994) focus particularly on the notion of 
“incongruence”—the idea that when groups, such as 
developers and users of, say, a database system, share 
different assumptions about information technologies, 
these differences might cause problems, including 
breakdown in communication, disinvestment or social 
clashes (Zuboff, 1988; Wastell, 1999). While this 
approach considers the conscious and unconscious 
priming of frames, their activation, and the speed with 
which they are accessed (Sherman, Mackie, & 
Driscoll, 1990; Epley & Gilovich, 1999), early studies 
fail to examine their political and affective 
implications. 
This shortcoming has been addressed by a group of 
authors who convincingly argued that technology 
framing should be understood also as a sociopolitical 
process (Markus & Bjorn-Andersen, 1987; 
McLoughlin, Badham, & Couchman, 2000; Marabelli 
& Galliers, 2017; Simeonova et al., 2018). This group 
of scholars examined, in particular, how political 
framings are enacted through narratives and subjective 
interpretations held by groups (e.g., Bartis & Mitev, 
2008; Fincham, 2002). They suggest that different 
framings underpin and sustain different and at times 
conflicting values. These authors make a distinction 
between frame inconsistency, when the conflict of 
views takes place within a group of stakeholders, and 
frame incongruence, when the conflict is between the 
views of relatively homogeneous stakeholder groups. 
For example, Leonardi (2011) found that engineers 
frame the same technology in different ways in 
different departments, thus displaying frame 
incongruence. 
Mazmanian (2013), on the contrary, discusses how 
mobile email devices were framed differently by two 
occupational groups. While stakeholders often resolve 
within-group inconsistencies through some form of 
consensus-building or convergence (Young, 
Matthiassen, & Davidson, 2016), between-group 
incongruence gives rise to political maneuvering and 
conflicts. For example, Barrett et al. (2013) observed 
the potential dissent that can emerge between various 
computerization movement entrepreneurs. Suchman 
(1995) argues that the normative legitimacy of a 
technology is often obtained at the level of a struggle 
for meaning between different groups of stakeholders 
and can be viewed as the outcome of processes of 
technology framing and counterframing (Azad & 
Faraj, 2011). The process is thus inherently political. 
Studies that focus explicitly on incongruence of frames 
between groups (Orlikowski & Gash, 1994) still 
assume a distinction between frame incongruence and 
inconsistency, the assumption being that stakeholders 
understand technology designs in a certain way 
because they are part of a specific interest group. In 
contrast, in this paper, we are interested in the process 
through which actors’ (re)positioning within a group 
can lead to contradictions between groups (Bernardi, 
Constantinides, & Nandhakumar, 2017), enabling a 
competing frame to contest the hegemony of the 
dominant one. In short, we are interested in the 
affective links between frame inconsistency and frame 
incongruency and in the way this dynamic may shape 
buy-in. 
The foundations for a more blurred distinction between 
“within-” and “between-groups” have been established 
by IS authors investigating the idea of performative 
framing (Geels & Verhees, 2011; Cecez-Kecmanovic 
et al., 2014). Rather than focusing on the individual or 
occupational level, as is typical in a more cognitively 
oriented approach, these researchers conceptualize 
frames and frame-making as the active social 
construction and negotiation of meaning through 
interactive processes of communication. For example, 
Benford and Snow (2000) suggest that a collectively 
held perception of a situation is generated via 
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contentious framing, which is essentially a 
performative process, born within situated practice, 
and highly emergent and unpredictable. The 
performative approach further emphasizes that 
collective meaning-making takes place on public 
stages (e.g., public debates, media, newspapers) and 
might involve various stakeholders including social 
movements, industry associations, policy makers, and 
special-interest groups that engage in discursive 
struggles seeking to influence collective framings 
(Geels & Verhees, 2011). Crucially for us, Cecez-
Kecmanovic et al. (2014) look at projects as actor-
networks that enroll and mobilize various IT groups—
managers, technologies, IS developers, 
methodologies, business cases, users, committees, 
project documents, reports, and others. 
From this perspective, political performativity is 
instantiated in the construction and maintenance of 
networks comprising both human and nonhuman 
actors (Callon, 1986; Law, 1992): the focus is on how 
networks of power relations are composed, how they 
come into being, how they compete with other 
networks, and how they are made more durable over 
time (Latour, 1991). Further, Cecez-Kecmanovic et al. 
(2014) argue that a performative framing renders 
intelligible the meaning-making, interpretive, and 
political processes of technology project assessments. 
While partially acknowledging the persuasion that is 
inherent to performative framing when enrolling other 
actors in the network (Latour, 1996), approaches 
driven by actor-network theory (ANT) have been 
accused of downplaying criticality and thereby 
potentially colluding with powerful actors (e.g., 
Walsham, 1997; McLean & Hassard, 2004; Whittle & 
Spicer, 2008). ANT also has been traditionally silent 
on the role of affectivity and emotionality—partly as a 
consequence of its original project to rebalance 
attention across human and nonhuman actants in social 
affairs (Latour, 2005). Although more recently, 
“affective ANT” (Sage, Vitry, & Dainty, 2019) has 
acknowledged a certain distinctiveness to human 
agency by foregrounding the role of affect in enabling 
the diffusion of technological bodies, emotions, and 
human passions that are still viewed as the 
consequence of technologies that activate them; for 
Latour, to have a body is “to learn to be affected” 
(2004). 
In this paper, we build on this important work on the 
politicization of framing and try to offer an explanation 
not only for how—but also for why a particular group’s 
interpretation comes to command more attention: in 
other words, why some framings become more 
seductive and more powerful than others (Davidson, 
2006; Kaplan, 2008; Steinberg, 1998). To respond to 
this question, we first need to examine what we know 
about the links between motivations and collective 
dynamics that surround buy-in to technology framing. 
2.2 Group Motivations 
Authors who conceptualize IS as a sociopolitical arena 
in which various interest groups follow their own 
motivations suggest that institutional, strategic, and 
ideological drives are typically at work (e.g., Robey & 
Boudreau, 1999; Berente & Yoo, 2012). Groups can be 
driven by institutional pressures, i.e., institutionalized 
values and prescriptions that sustain and legitimize 
their behaviors (Avgerou, 2004; Powell & Colyvas, 
2008; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). For 
example, authors such as Berente and Yoo (2012) used 
the concept of institutional logics—not to be confused 
with the Logics approach discussed here—to describe 
the contextual and semantic factors surrounding 
organization-bound activities. An institutional logic 
approach “emphasizes that actors do act rationally, but 
that this rationality is embedded in a context of goals 
and taken-for-granted assumptions that are situated 
within a particular institutional context” (Berente & 
Yoo, 2012, p. 378). An example is Orlikowski and 
Barley’s exploration of the role of telecommuting and 
the increasing ubiquity of work-related computing in 
violating the institution of industrial employment that 
relies on the separation between work and family. 
These authors argue that full-time telecommuting is 
rare because institutional forces have constrained its 
spread (Orlikowski & Barley, 2001). 
A main limitation of the current institutional framing 
approach is that it implicitly assumes group 
consensus—the idea that individuals within groups, 
organizations, or institutions, respond uniformly to the 
design of an information system—an assumption that 
may not be borne out in reality. The same applies to 
the dynamic between information systems 
stakeholders such as policy makers, activists, 
government agencies, and professional and 
membership organizations, which may harbor different 
interests, power, and influence and may therefore act 
differently (Pouloudi, Wendy, & Whiteley, 2016). The 
idea of institutional framing thus downplays the 
conditioning and agency of local actors, as well as their 
unique interests, personal incentives, and motivation. 
As a result, studies may downplay the agency of 
disruptive actors such as “technical champions” in 
delivering large-scale technology programs and acting 
as drivers of institutional change (Currie & Guah, 
2007). They also background the presence of less 
institutionally legitimate aspirations derived from 
alternative group memberships—a phenomenon 
exacerbated by the boundary-less nature of online 
forms of organizing and their resulting overlapping 
memberships (Wang, Butler, & Ren, 2013). 
The development of strategies for acquiring or 
preserving key resources has been identified as another 
critical motivation driving group decisions toward 
framing concerns. Kaplan (2008) shows how skilled 
social actors develop cognitive frames to persuade 
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others that what is proposed is in their best interests; 
accordingly, corporate sensemaking typically involves 
the skillful use of affectively charged metaphors, 
catchphrases, slogans, and stories (Cornelissen, Holtm, 
& Zundel, 2012; Fairhurst, 2010). For example, 
strategic and institutional actors typically use flattering 
idioms, images, and metaphors to mobilize political 
backing and rally stakeholders behind their organizing 
visions (Ellingsen & Monteiro, 2008). Similarly, 
framing tactics, skilled rhetorics, and discursive ability 
are often able to color the interpretations of an 
audience to the point of blinding them to alternative 
options (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007). That said, some 
authors have highlighted the risk of casting 
organizational members as passive respondents to 
managers’ speech and sensemaking, calling for more 
balanced configurations that do not privilege the act of 
the speaker over the listener by acknowledging cultural 
and possibly less conscious motivations which are not 
exclusively institutional or driven by strategic interests 
(Chreim, 2006). 
Finally, groups are also driven by ideological 
motivations. Ideology is understood here as a set of 
discursive, symbolic, and material practices through 
which meaning about how the world is and ought to be 
“serves to sustain relations of domination” 
(Thompson, 1984, p. 146 in Constantinides & Barrett, 
2014, p. 4). Boland and Tenkasi’s (1995) concepts of 
perspective making, perspective taking, and 
perspective shaping illuminated the sensemaking 
activities of individuals situated within communities of 
knowing, highlighting the importance of narrative in 
this process (e.g., 1995 p. 357). Robey and Markus 
(1984) argue that system design often entails a strong 
ideological dimension that symbolizes rationality, 
regardless of the rationality of the technology itself. In 
this view, the use of state-of-the-art technologies and 
“corporate cybernetic ideology” (Meyer, 1982, p. 54) 
holds symbolic value beyond mere utility and signals 
to employees and clients that the organization favors 
efficient and progressive management. In other cases, 
technology symbolizes professionalism, a 
characterization that can render it more affectively 
desirable (e.g., a source of pride and prestige for those 
who have access) and exclude serious opposition by 
ensuring long-term commitment to it (Prasad, 1993). 
For Mingers and Walsham (2010), some of the 
political questions around IS involve a kind of 
rationality that extends beyond the sole bargaining of 
interests and institutional relations and truly 
acknowledges ideological differences—the contrast 
between purist proponents of the “free software 
movement” and advocates of the “private-collective” 
model, i.e., collective action supported with private 
investment (Elliott & Scacchi, 2008), being a clear 
example. Building on this approach, Barrett et al. 
(2013) propose an ideological framing approach to 
make sense of the politics that shape the development 
of information systems. The authors describe such 
framing as rhetorics that serve ideological goals: for 
instance, the open source movement claims that 
involving collective knowledge in the production of 
technology results in higher quality software, and a 
better society—such rhetorics supported technology 
diffusion through the widespread success of Linux. 
Our argument here is that all three motivations need to 
be taken into consideration at the same time in order to 
understand peoples’ buy-in to a specific technology. In 
our view, affectively driven ideological motivations 
complement and integrate institutional and strategic 
ones. Our aim here is to deepen these studies of 
ideological motivation by explaining why some frames 
“make it” (Sahlin & Wedlin 2008 p. 221) while others 
do not. Accordingly, in the next section, we suggest 
that a fuller understanding of the collective framing of 
technology requires a closer look within the IS 
community at the political operation of affect. 
2.3 Toward an Understanding of 
Affective Politics in IS 
In this section, we focus specifically on work to date 
on the relationship between affect and technology 
framing, a dynamic that remains largely unexplored in 
IS (see Appendix A). We use the term “affective 
politics” to encapsulate the essential contestability of 
technology discourse and associated framing, as well 
as the way in which an actor’s propensity to contest or 
accept a particular framing is moderated by affect. In 
spite of increasing evidence that affect and emotions 
play a major role in the operation and use of digital 
media (Karatzogianni & Kuntsman, 2012), relatively 
few authors have addressed the issue of affect and 
framing of technology at the individual-collective 
level. Those authors who have attempted such a focus 
have adopted one of three approaches. 
A first group of authors addresses the interlinkages 
between affect and cognitive framing from a 
phenomenological perspective (e.g., Boland, 1985; 
Zuboff, 1988; Brigham & Introna, 2006; Introna & 
Whittaker, 2003; Wynn, Whitley, & Myers, 2002; 
Ciborra, 2006; Thompson, 2012). For example, Faÿ et 
al. (2010) shed light on the coexistence of two distinct 
but intertwined modalities of perception. The first is 
“seeing” or perceiving objects and phenomena in an 
abstract, rational, and rather distant way; the second is 
affectivity or “embodied affectedness,” which leaves 
no distance between us and our affective perceptions. 
For these authors, embodied affectedness and 
cognition (Mingers, 2001) work together with 
cognitive framing (through numbers, culture, 
language, etc.) to predispose us in particular ways to 
remain unaware of phenomena with which we are 
confronted, including new technologies. An example 
is Thompson’s (2012) “biographical” affect: actors’ 
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affective self-identification and social positioning in 
the present result from their unique historical exposure 
to forms of social framing, which in turn conditions 
their subconscious motivations toward information 
systems. 
A second group explores the linkages between affect 
and cognitive framing using a psychodynamic 
approach, which addresses the dynamic relations 
between conscious and unconscious motivation (e.g., 
Hirschhorn 1988; Wastell & Newman, 1993; Wastell, 
1996; 1999). In this view, social defenses and 
protection from anxiety typically manifest themselves 
through the fantasy of self-aggrandizement (users’ 
belief in “autonomy”); they may also appear through 
fantasy that attributes methodology with fetishistic 
appeal, deriving superficial comfort from addressing 
“the letter” rather than “the spirit” of tackling deeper 
problems (Wastell, 1996). For Wastell (1999) affect is 
thus centrally important to understanding resistance to 
IS development and associated withdrawal of social 
engagement through the construct of emotional 
resistance that links the notion of affect, politics, and 
power. 
Such a view is central also to the third approach, 
inspired by the Foucauldian perspective on IS (e.g., 
Bloomfield et al., 1997; Silva & Backhouse, 2003; 
Willcocks, 2004; Avgerou & McGrath, 2005; Doolin, 
2004; McGrath, 2006; Avgerou & McGrath, 2007). 
This approach blends rationality and power through 
the formation of competing “regimes of truth” 
(Foucault, 1979) and acknowledges the authoritative 
character of much technical-rational framing about IS. 
However, it suggests that while groups seem to adopt 
resource-seeking strategies, power also operates 
unconsciously in their routine and daily actions: 
groups uncritically accept social control and 
autoregulate themselves (Coombs, Knights, & 
Willmott, 1992). From this perspective, power is not 
the capacity of an individual agent but results instead 
from the circulation of discourse and disciplinary 
techniques (Silva & Backhouse, 2003). Individuals’ 
problematization is possible but it manifests as the 
rejection of the “aesthetics of their existence” rather 
than open resistance (Avgerou & McGrath, 2007, p. 
300). 
For example, Avgerou and McGrath (2005) analyze 
the failure of the London Ambulance Service 
Computer Aided Dispatch—an innovative system that 
automated the management of the London Ambulance 
Service’s emergency call function and was rejected by 
participants (e.g., sabotaged) who discharged their 
frustration when using it. Central to Avgerou and 
McGrath’s (2005) account is the technomanagerial 
“regime of truth” and its focus on administrative 
efficiency—a focus that ignored other important 
dimensions of IS, such as the emotionally charged 
behaviors of the participants. In sum, the Foucauldian 
approach is helpful in addressing how peoples’ 
receptiveness toward a certain technology requires 
their consent to a specific “regime of truth” (Foucault, 
1991, p. 73), whose disciplinary power reaches the 
most intimate spaces of the subject and may trigger 
forms of resistance. 
Table 1 summarizes our review of the literature on 
technology framing, collective motivations, and 
affective politics. The literature review illustrates that 
affect is increasingly granted an explanatory role in 
processes of accepting or resisting the framing of 
technology (see also Brave & Nass, 2003). Technology 
buy-in implies that affect as an agential force may lead 
actors to identify with some framings of technology 
and deidentify with others—often subconsciously and 
thus unacknowledged either by themselves or by 
researchers. Our review also exposes the insight that 
while existing studies acknowledge that framings are 
generated in technology design, few have actually 
connected the areas of sociopolitical framing, group 
motivations, and affective politics in any systematic 
way. This paper takes an initial step in engaging with 
these issues, by showing how technology designers 
themselves may be affectively invested in particular 
self-identifications that render them more, or less, 
susceptible to technology framing. In turn, this enables 
us to shed light on the affective politics underlying 
buy-in to particular framings of IS by demonstrating 
how affect may be considered both a medium and 
outcome of IS practices. This is important because 
without paying the necessary attention to the 
psychosocial dimension of this phenomenon, both 
researchers and practitioners risk approaching 
technology framing in ways that are at best inaccurate 
and at worst naively optimistic about the 
straightforwardness with which this may be 
accomplished, with serious consequences for 
organizations. In order to accomplish this agenda, we 
require a conceptual framework capable of 
foregrounding the connection of framing and power 
via the medium of affect: a lens grounded within an 
affect-based ontology of practice. We now introduce 
the Logics theoretical approach. 
3 Affect as Medium of Practice: 
Introducing the Logics 
3.1 Conceptualizing Affect, Meaning-
Making, and Power 
We propose an affect-based ontology of practice that 
captures those aspects of a practice that “make it tick,” 
and offers an explanation of how such aspects enable a 
practice to reproduce or transform itself (Glynos & 
Howarth, 2007). Such an ontology arguably offers an 
important tool for uncovering and studying the politics 
of affect in IS.  
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Table 1. Literature Review of Technology Framing, Collective Motivations, and Affective Politics 
Key insights Research Gaps Research stream 
Example 
articles 
Theoretical focus & 
core concepts 
Sociopolitical 
framing:  
Buy-in is the 
outcome of a 
dynamic of framing 
and counterframing  
Framings are constructed 
politically in the course of 
actions but we lack an 
approach that foregrounds 
the place of affect in this 
performative process. 
• Sociocognitive  
• Sociopolitical 
• Actor-network   
 
• Orlikowski & 
Gash (1994) 
• Mcloughin et 
al. (2000) 
• Cecez-
Kecmanovic 
et al. (2014) 
• Cognition and 
microlevel 
sensemaking 
• Political process 
perspective and 
“sociotechnical 
configurations” 
• Actor-network theory 
and “performative 
framing”  
Group motivations: 
Symbolic 
motivations such as 
ideology and rituals 
are closely 
intertwined with the 
framing process 
Existing views downplay 
noninstitutional and 
nonstrategic motivations. 
The notion of affect builds 
on and enriches ideological 
framings by surfacing their 
ethical dimensions. 
• Strategic  
• Institutional  
• Ideological 
 
• Kaplan 
(2008) 
• Berente & 
Yoo (2012) 
• Barrett et al. 
(2013) 
 
• Strategy as practice 
and “framing contest” 
• Institutional 
motivations and 
“louse coupling”   
• Rhetorical approach 
and “Ideological 
framing”  
Affective politics: 
Affect is not only the 
outcome but also the 
medium through 
which an ideological 
framing prevails over 
others 
Actors are still described as 
somewhat passive containers 
of affects rather than co-
producers of organizational 
power. 
• Psychodynamic 
• Phenomenological 
• Foucauldian   
• Wastell 
(1996) 
• Faÿ et al. 
(2010) 
• Avgerou & 
McGrath 
(2007) 
 
• Psychodynamics and 
“social defenses”  
• Henry’s 
phenomenology and 
“living praxis” 
• Foucault’s theory of 
sexuality and “ethical 
problematization” 
(2007, p. 299) 
This is because it provides an appreciation of how 
actors’ affective identifications and disidentifications 
are immanently shaped by the symbolic ordering of the 
power relations in which they are (historically) 
immersed. Within this framework, affect (see Brief & 
Weiss, 2002; Fineman, 1993; Schmidt & Gibson, 
2010; Simpson & Marshall, 2010; Voronov & Vince, 
2012) is conceptualized as being socially embedded 
rather than subjective (e.g., Thrift, 2000; Chia & 
MacKay, 2007). Like Thompson and Willmott (2016), 
our concern with affect thus is more “psychosocial” 
than “psychological,” the latter being typically 
concerned with extracting individual affective states 
(specific moods and emotions) from their social 
context. By “psychosocial,” we mean that we seek to 
uncover the causal relationship between the political 
mobilization of affect and social outcomes. Our focus 
is thus on affective processes of subjectification 
through collective emotions that link behaviors and 
 
1  Glynos and Howarth distinguish between ontic and 
ontological as follows: “In Being and Time Heidegger argues 
that an ontical inquiry focuses on particular types of objects 
and entities that are located within a particular domain or 
structure, as well as on how these dynamics shape 
people and systems. 
In studying the way in which affect may act as a 
medium as well as an outcome of meaning-making in 
practice, we follow the tradition of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s Essex School of discourse analysis 
(Marchart, 2007). Authors in this tradition argue that 
our contact with reality is necessarily constituted 
through and mediated by a basic “grammar.” This 
grammar, which they call discourse, “is largely 
unconscious … so the task of the discourse analyst is 
to explore the immanent grammars which underlie all 
kinds of meaningful intervention” (Laclau & Bhaskar, 
1998, p. 9). In this school of thought, the discursive 
frames and power relations that we can see at the ontic, 
observable level of unfolding practice are constituted 
temporarily from an underlying, ontological universe 
of discursive possibilities of seeing, feeling, and doing, 
possibilities that are only partially visible1 (Laclau & 
‘region’ of phenomena, whereas an ontological inquiry 
concerns the categorical preconditions for such objects and 
their investigation” (2007, p. 108). 
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Mouffe, 1985; Thompson & Willmott, 2016; Hoefer & 
Green, 2016). Accordingly, our purpose here is to 
explore the affective operation of this unconscious, 
immanent grammar on IS practices and thus to further 
the investigation of affect’s mediating action on social 
meaning-making and power relations. In turn, gaining 
a full understanding of technology framing requires 
some attempt to expose and comment upon these 
discursive possibilities, as well as on their relationships, 
with more empirically visible dimensions of unfolding 
social practice. 
To assist in rendering this unconscious, immanent 
discourse somewhat more visible, we draw in 
particular on Glynos and Howarth’s (2007, 2008) 
Logics approach. Developed from within the Essex 
School, Logics enables researchers to relate what 
happens in the sphere of concrete, specific, and visible 
social conduct at the ontic level with what may be 
taking place at the underlying, deeper and less visible 
ontological level where affect operates. Crucially, the 
approach allows researchers to comment on the 
dialogue between ontic and ontological (in simplified 
formulation, observable vs. unconscious) levels and to 
examine the social consequences of the relationship 
between the two. The Logics approach has been 
translated into management studies by Thompson and 
Willmott (2016) but, to our knowledge, we are the first 
to propose its use in IS. 
Logics thus appears an ideal framework within which 
to understand the interplay between visible attempts to 
frame technology in a particular way at the discursive, 
ontic level with actors’ ontological, invisible, and 
affectively located predispositions to passively 
reproduce or actively defend or challenge such framing. 
In formulating Logics, Glynos and Howarth are 
informed by Laclau, for whom the state of things, the 
extant power relations, and the preservation of the 
status quo depends in part on the extent to which actors 
continue to self-identify—or not—with their 
associated discursive practices. Accordingly, there is 
always a “trace of contingency within the structure” 
(Laclau 1993, p. 435). The notion of contingency, the 
idea that “the way things are is never a ‘done deal’ and 
things could be different,” is crucial, as it enables us to 
highlight the constructed, precarious, and political 
character of social objectivity—such as a particular 
framing of technology. The ongoing and always 
provisional processes of affective identification with a 
practice, however, occur within the ontological (deep 
and unconscious) dimension of a practice—a 
dimension that usually remains invisible to actors and 
researchers but that comes to affect their response to 
discursive attempts at framing something in a 
particular way. Such alternative possibilities—and 
thus the contingency of apparently stable structures 
such as technology frames on our continuing 
acceptance of them—are usually invisible, since such 
contingency is typically masked by the “status quo”: 
the prevailing configuration of power relations in the 
ontic (empirically visible) dimension. 
3.2 The Logics Framework 
In setting out their Logics framework, Glynos and 
Howarth (2008) (see also Clarke, 2011; Ekman 2013; 
Holtzman 2013; Thompson and Willmott 2016) 
explain this unfolding relationship between ontic 
(visible/discursive) and ontological (invisible/affective) 
dimensions of unfolding social reality. In a nutshell, 
the Logics are threefold: social (reproduction) logics 
act to normalize and preserve the status quo. Political 
logics mitigate against social logics by questioning 
them, or by proposing alternative practices that 
challenge their taken-for-granted status. Crucially, 
fantasmatic logics mediate between these two by 
supplying the affective motivation through which 
actors are moved either to reproduce social logics (and 
associated discourses) or to subscribe to political 
logics (and associated discourses) that challenge the 
status quo. 
Fantasmatic logics are underpinned by a 
psychoanalytic recognition of the importance of actors’ 
powerful processes of self-identification, in which they 
may be prepared, unconsciously, to gloss over or 
entirely overlook alternative or contrasting 
possibilities that threaten idealized self-images or 
projections. Fantasmatic logics thus add a second 
dimension to power relations besides the social 
reproduction vs. contestation dimension mentioned 
above. This has to do with awareness of alternatives 
and the ways individuals experience and react to 
contingency. Glynos and Howarth (2008) suggest that 
Fantasmatic logics operate between two extreme poles 
that they name as the “ideological” (unquestioning 
conformity) and “ethical” (skeptical) modes of 
engagement.  
An ideological mode of engagement refers to the 
tendency of subjects to be carried away by and 
succumb to “competing hyperintense fantasies” 
(Glynos, 2008, p. 291), whereas an ethical mode of 
engagement entails a strong skeptical orientation 
whereby “a subject [is] struggling with her or his 
tendency to fantasize at all.” Closer to the ethical pole, 
an individual thus become more fully aware of 
alternatives framings, recognizes “the contingency of 
identifications and resists ‘buying in’ to them” 
(Thompson & Willmott, 2016, p. 489). 
Together, the Logics provide an analytical framework 
with which to discuss the unfolding relationship 
between affect, meaning-making, and power relations 
that, indeed, reveals these as dimensions of a single 
phenomenon. The four analytical dimensions of the 
framework (social, political, ideological, and ethical) 
can be placed within a quadrant, as shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Four Dimensions of Social Relations, Modified to Include Explanatory Notes  
(see Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p. 112 and Thompson and Willmott, 2016, p. 488) 
Figure 2 proposes several possible configurations of 
affect, meaning-making, and power with associated 
social outcomes, aligned along two axes. The most 
important of these for our discussion is the horizontal 
axis, which charts the extent to which actors, when 
identifying with a particular discourse on technology, 
are impelled by an affective overinvestment that leads 
them to ignore or gloss over alternatives or, by 
contrast, to remain detached and open to these 
alternatives. 
We now can conjecture about how these four poles 
(socio-ideological; socio-ethical; politico-ideological 
and politico-ethical) are able to inform and deepen 
existing analyses of the framing and conceptualization, 
of IS. Actors’ discourse and actions are mediated by 
their affective predispositions and operate in the ontic 
(visible) dimension. Thus, on the right side of Figure 
2, actors’ judgment is less clouded by affective 
identification with existing discursive power relations; 
they are thus more ethically aware that their 
 
2 From our perspective, it is crucial to distinguish computer 
ethics from the mainstream use of the notion in IS (i.e., the 
rationalist prescriptions and their encapsulation in a 
professional codes of ethics). To us, ethics is linked to the 
practice of critique by revealing points of social contestation 
and possible reversal, which we have called openness to 
alternatives: “An ethical decision, in other words, is one 
identifications are contingent on their continued 
support and that they could challenge prevailing power 
relations should they so wish. Following Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, this kind of open stance can be 
qualified as ethical because it renders possible a 
different relation to the object of affective 
identification (fantasy), one that is not overinvested but 
detached. By taking some distance from objects of 
affective identification, subjects are more attentive to 
the ambivalence that may enable alternative readings. 
Ethical awareness thus entails a “genuine openness to 
contingency” (Glynos 2008, p. 16), a recognition of the 
fundamentally political origins of a practice. This 
renders subjects aware of other possibilities and they 
are thus likely to be more skeptical of any one 
particular proposition. 
This definition of ethics differs from the normative (or 
mainstream) approach2 in IS. Ethics is understood here 
as concerning the way that subjects relate to norms 
rather than the content of the norms governing 
which is by definition impure, impossible even. An ethical 
decision requires that something escape its purview, requires 
the subjective acknowledgment that someone or something 
somewhere, will be adversely affected. In this view, every 
ethical decision is accompanied by superegoic doubts and 
feelings of guilt, betraying an unquenchable and infinite 
responsibility.” (Glynos, 2000) 
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practices (i.e., “critical ethics”—see, e.g., Critchley, 
1999; Robinson, 1999; Rainsford and Woods, 1999 for 
a discussion). Thus, on the left side of Figure 2, actors 
are less aware of the underlying contingency and 
contestability of discursive power relations with which 
they may be confronted because they are more self-
invested in forms of ideological self-identification that 
cloud their judgment. In turn, the vertical axis of 
contestation, which operates in the empirically visible, 
ontic dimension, relates to the power relations 
themselves. At the “political” top of Figure 2, actors 
have a greater propensity to challenge or establish new, 
discursive power relations—and, at the “social” 
bottom of Figure 2, to reproduce prevailing ones. The 
motivation axis provides us with insight into how 
strong and long-lasting this propensity to contest is. 
However affective motivation is not visible; it is the 
resulting course of action that is visible and it thus 
belongs in the ontic dimension. 
In sum, the Logics framework offers IS researchers a 
valuable analytical lens that enables a greater 
attentiveness to the contingent interrelationship 
between affect, meaning-making, and power in 
technology framing. In distinguishing between the 
empirically visible, cognitively amenable ontic 
dimension and the empirically invisible, affectively 
mediated and cognitively unavailable ontological 
dimension of practice, the Logics can help researchers 
theorize about actors’ affectively mediated 
predispositions toward and thus mode of engagement 
with unfolding social practice in a more nuanced way 
that encompasses discourse and its relationship with 
affect. In the next section, we illustrate these 
theoretical developments with reference to a more 
detailed empirical example. 
4 Applying the Logics: How Affect 
Conditioned Buy-In to 
Technology Framing in the Case 
of Unity 3D 
In this section, we illustrate the analytical power and 
utility of the Logics approach with reference to the 
detailed empirical example of the game engine Unity 3D. 
The illustrative material derives from a 15-month study 
of Unity 3D conducted from September 2012 to 
December 2013. In the ethnographic study,3 we observed 
multiple community events, conferences, start-ups’ 
meetings, and online forums. We also interviewed 
strategic actors, read the specialized press, and carefully 
studied marketing documents and blogs (reference 
omitted to preserve anonymity). Game engines are 
 
3 Theorizing affective ethnography involves the power to act 
of the researcher and has been described as a style of being 
particularly suitable to illustrate our argument, as they 
constitute affective technologies in the sense meant by 
Hudlicka (2009). Game engines are in fact designed to 
facilitate the development of affect-adaptive and realistic 
games. In our empirical illustration, we discuss a 
particular game engine: Unity 3D. Details about Unity 
are provided below. Further methodological details of 
the study, which is used here with the sole purpose to 
support our theoretical argument, are provided in 
Appendix B. 
4.1 Background: The Game Engine 
Unity 3D  
The technological significance of game engines derives 
from their role as the software intermediary that 
interacts with the hardware of the target platform on 
which a game will be played. The game engine 
translates digital objects, referred to by game developers 
as assets, from the format in which they were initially 
developed into code that can be run on the game 
platform (Panourgias, Nandhakumar, & Scarbrough, 
2013). Unity is a platform that enables programmers and 
artists to work together in the same environment. The 
developers create the logic that runs the game by 
assigning script codes to the 3D models that the artists 
have created. The tasks of artists working with Unity 
consist of polishing, texturing up, and customizing the 
prefab assets bought and sold on the Asset Store. The 
Asset Store allows the developers to create their game 
without the usual constraints (e.g., time, 
communication, costs) involved in working with artists: 
they just need to “drag and drop” the prefab assets, 
which minimizes coding effort. Character models, 
props, materials and textures, landscape painting tools, 
game creation tools, audio effects/music, and visual 
programming solutions are all available from the Asset 
Store. Figure 3, taken from a tutorial presentation at 
Unity’s “Unite: Conference 2013,” illustrates an asset, 
in this case, an animated character for a role-playing 
game used for the purpose of the demonstration. 
In our study, we examine both the Unity platform 
owners and its online community of developers, which 
is consistent with our claim that IT framing occurs at 
both levels. Indeed, recent studies shed light on the role 
played by participants in online gaming communities 
in contributing to the development of online games 
(Kjærsgaard & Smith, 2014, Antonopoulou, 
Nandhakumar, & Panourgias, 2014; Barrett, Oborn, & 
Orlikowski, 2016). This contribution needs to be 
considered in the context of a large and important 
industry.  
in the field, being with and becoming-with others (Gherardi, 
2018). 
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Figure 3. An Animated Avatar for the Demo of a Role-Playing Game During a Unite Tutorial 
In 2018, there were nearly 2.3 billion gamers across the 
globe, amounting to an industry worth $137.9 billion. 
Mobile gaming, in particular, is in the ascendant, 
accounting for 91% of the market (source: Newzoo’s 
2018 Global Games Market Report). Computer games 
are indeed becoming a sport, complete with national 
and international competitions and tournaments, 
trophies and significant monetary prizes, influencers, 
known and celebrity players, and even ergonomic 
products for long gaming sessions (controllers, chairs, 
blue-light blocking glasses, etc.). 
In our illustration, we focus on Unity specifically 
during a critical period of rapid growth, during which 
its management attempted to leverage affectively 
motivated discourses (e.g., the founder’s slogan “Let’s 
democratize game development!”) to position the 
company as an alternative to proprietary game engines, 
which were predominant until the beginning of the 
2010s. The attempt was largely successful. The market 
share of Unity has grown rapidly since the time of the 
study. In April 2012, Unity reported 1 million 
registered developers, 300,000 of whom used Unity on 
a regular monthly basis. By April 2015, the number of 
reported registered developers reported by the 
company had reached 4.5 million, with 1 million 
monthly active users (source: online interview with 
Unity’s CEO on www.venturebeat.com). 
Based on the above, our illustration discusses the 
framing generated by two powerful Unity figures: the 
chief executive officer and Unity’s UK director. This 
exemplifies how different affective stances of 
important developers toward framing strategies 
condition varying degrees of buy-in to such framing 
and, thus, different configurations of power. We now 
turn to Unity’s online community of users to observe 
the various configurations through which these 
framings are enrolled by game developers. We 
demonstrate how the characters move through 
different configurations, as foregrounded by our 
Logics lens. Finally, we provide a short description of 
what we observed, followed by a brief interpretation in 
each case, based on an examination of the data through 
the Logics lens. 
4.2 Logics of the Game Engine 
Framing: The Case of Unity 
As discussed above, normative legitimacy and buy-in 
can be viewed as the outcome of technology framing 
and counterframing (Azad & Faraj, 2011), both of 
which are underscored by politico-affective dynamics. 
Recalling the Logics quadrant in Figure 2, we make a 
key distinction between social framing (the logic of 
status quo) and political framing (the logic of 
contestation and alternative). In the case presented here, 
Unity adopts a political framing to present itself as an 
alternative to proprietary game engines. 
4.2.1 Unity’s Design: Promoting Buy-In 
Through a Political Discursive Framing 
The political framing and underlying configuration of 
affect, power, and meaning-making are evident first in 
the performance of CEO David Helgason, in which he 
seeks to capture and fuel the energy of his audience. 
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The following quote is an excerpt from David 
Helgason’s speech at the Unite conference in 2013, 
where he muses rhetorically about the affective appeal 
that drives the industry by sustaining and motivating 
its engineers: 
Wherever I go anywhere where we have 
engineers, which is a lot of places now, you 
know, I find people working days and nights 
and really kind of [silence] ... spending all 
the energy they have to solve your problems  
... When we look around and talk to people 
who have been part of the industry much 
longer than we have, everyone agrees that 
the game industry has never been this 
healthy and bursting with energy and 
vitamins, so I think it’s interesting to kind of 
ask ourselves why all this energy, why is it 
that things are so, well not just great, they 
are competitive and crazy, but also ... really 
awesome. (Excerpt from the CEO’s public 
speech at Unite) 
In this quote, the CEO reflexively engages with the 
affective grounding of the community in which he 
plays an influential role (“kind of ask ourselves why all 
this energy”) and uses hyperbolic terms reflecting the 
affective appeal of Unity (“crazy,” “awesome”). 
Figure 4 illustrates the way in which the CEO’s 
“political” rhetoric was amplified by careful attention 
to theatrical performance—as was also the case with 
Steve Jobs for instance—and thus helped cement this 
“energetic,” “democratizing” positioning in the minds 
of the audience.  
Figure 4 shows the CEO describing the emergence of 
the mobile market, which he claims is transforming the 
gaming industry not only in terms of the platforms on 
which such games are played (e.g., iPads, mobile 
devices, and consoles) but also in terms of the richness 
of their content, the size of the teams, the product 
quality, and the technical expectations regarding the 
game engine. 
 
Figure 4. Helgason’s Speech at Unite 2013 (Photographs Taken During Fieldwork) 
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Thus, in the words of Unity’s UK director whose 
rhetoric appears to mirror the discourse of what appears 
to be a charismatic CEO within this company, mobile 
game development is explicitly contrasted with 
designing games for consoles: 
Well, indie games, the area of games Unity is 
best known for… you know you have console 
developers making very large, very large and 
very complex games that run on PlayStation 
3 or Xbox, so that’s pretty much the AAA end 
of the market … Very small teams… two one 
people … could make a game for mobile 
phones by themselves in the bedrooms, and 
become very, very successful, so that’s far 
more sort of indie, independent game-ended 
market … they are called indie because they 
are independent, they haven’t got a publisher 
funding them. (Unity’s UK director) 
This quote is important because it shows how the indie 
market is narrated via biographical success stories 
(“could make a game for mobile phones by themselves 
in the bedrooms”), which seductively mobilizes the 
affect of the community of Unity’s users via an 
empowering discourse. The deployment of social logic 
in the above quotation refers to the established practice 
of game design—namely, making games for consoles—
characterized by higher standards of professionalism 
involved in managing the higher risks, skilled graphics 
designers and the higher budgets commonly associated 
with designing games for consoles. Accordingly, the 
logic relating to console development is considered 
“social” (in the sense discussed above, i.e., reproducing 
the status quo), insofar as it is established and routinized. 
Indeed, creating a console game involves expectations 
about securing important actors in the field with “very 
deep pockets.” Thus, a second characteristic of the 
social logic is the importance of institutions (for 
example, the console game industry is dominated by 
platforms such as the PC, video games consoles, and 
publishers of games) and that a hierarchical order of 
things presides over social actors. 
In the above extract, Unity’s UK director contrasts this 
social logic with a political logic in which mobile game 
development is perceived as far easier, cheaper, and 
more accessible. The political framing, i.e., the framing 
of Unity in terms of being an alternative able to contest 
the status quo, questions the elitism of the game design 
practice and its particular recognition scheme (e.g., 
AAA games being the most visually appealing), and 
democratizes game design through tablets and mobiles: 
not everybody has a console, but everybody has a 
mobile device. Further, making small games on mobiles 
(e.g., puzzle or card games on an iPad) does not require 
significant effort and/or financial backing. Consider the 
following extract in which the UK director describes 
with soaring rhetoric the notion of democratization as 
specified in the marketing brochure and Unity’s 
website: 
Democratization just means we want 
anybody that’s got an idea to make a game, 
to have the tools to make the game. And then, 
you know the players of that game, you know 
the game-playing population in the world, 
can decide which games succeed, and which 
ones don’t, so it’s not who’s got the best tool, 
who’s got the best ideas, it’s really, anybody 
who wants to make a game can; that’s my 
view on the product, anybody who wants to 
make a game could use that tool. When we 
say anybody, literally anybody in the world, 
we mean anybody that’s got some technical 
skills, some understanding on how games 
work, could make a game. (Unity’s UK 
director) 
The director elevates the discussion of universalization 
by association with the notion of democratization, which 
contrasts with the frivolity usually associated with 
games. Thus, during the interview, we felt that the UK 
director was trying to persuade and impress us by using 
a hyperbolic style in the political dimension and 
downplaying the technical skills required: “literally 
anybody in the world; we mean anybody that’s got some 
technical skills.” 
4.2.2 The Fantasmatic Logic(s) Behind the 
Political Framing: Discourses of 
Community and Heroism 
Our discussion above illustrates the fantasmatic 
logic(s) through which important actors exemplified 
above in the examples of the CEO and the UK director 
mobilize discursive framings to shape the affective 
identification of the game designers. Fantasmatic 
logic(s) supply the affective motivation through which 
actors may be moved (or not) to subscribe to political 
framing and manifests itself through desire-based 
narratives that we label fantasies of community and 
heroism. Expressions such as “the game-playing 
population in the world” clearly position the buy-in to 
the game ecosystem as a form of citizenship or of 
belonging to a community. Metaphorically, Unity’s 
leaders’ political framing taps the fundamental 
identification and belonging needs of the developers 
(Bauman, 2013) and is akin to politicians’ affective 
mobilization of nationalist discourse—a phenomenon 
well known in the field of IS (von Krogh, Spaeth, S., 
& Lakhani, 2003). Further, to enhance these narratives, 
Unity’s leaders rallied strategic actors to its cause, such 
as historical figures and gaming gurus who had devised 
highly creative games from scratch.
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Table 2: Summary of the Three Logics Applied to the Framing of Unity 3D 
Logics Platform owners’ framing attempts 
Social Game design for entertainment:  
• Use limited to consoles (e.g., Xbox, Wii) 
• Design restricted to major studios (e.g., Nintendo, Microsoft) 
• Diffusion ruled by major publishers  
• Institutional accreditation scheme (AAA games) 
Political Democratized game design: 
• Use extended to tablets, mobiles, e-learning, serious gaming 
• Design transferred to small teams, service companies, indie developers 
• Independent-ended market (i.e., indie developers) 
Fantasmatic (affectively 
motivated)  
Desire-based narratives: 
• Heroism: heroic-fantasy imaginary (e.g., Ultima); successful entrepreneurial stories, 
freedom in regard to institutions 
• Community spirit: universality, metaphorical citizenship 
For example, during our fieldwork at the Unite 
conference, we attended a keynote speech by Richard 
Garriott de Cayeux—widely acknowledged within this 
community as a charismatic artist, programmer, and 
creative director. Garriott is the creator of the “Ultima” 
series, a very successful role-playing game in the 80s, 
who, in 1997, coined the acronym MMORPG 
(massively multiplayer online role-playing game) and 
thereby became a very influential figure in the field. 
During his speech, Garriott talked about an imaginary 
period, reinvoked and embellished in the retelling, when 
indie developers were free and prosperous. Like 
nationalist myths (Stavrakakis, 2007), the story of the 
independent developer and the reminiscences about the 
golden age of the independent studios on the 80s were 
harnessed to encourage affectively driven self-
identification by participants with Richard Gariott, and, 
by association, with the image of Unity, with the ideal 
of achieving freedom from the major studios and 
institutions. 
Moreover, this heroic narrative taps into developers’ 
vulnerability to self-identification with promising 
entrepreneurial discourses. In this scenario, indie 
developers typically buy into the beatific narrative of 
successful entrepreneurs, featuring one or two 
programmers becoming rich by developing an app in the 
intimacy of their “bedroom” on a very small budget. In 
particular, the UK director tells the story of a 
programmer who made some tools to help people with 
some 2D artwork and then supposedly made 
US$300,000 by selling this product on the Assets Store. 
Game designers systematically share success stories via 
blog posts or during socialization rituals, such as the 
company’s community events and online fora. Such 
stories recall similar legendary narratives, such as that 
recounting the creation of HP, when Bill Hewlett and 
Dave Packard built the company’s first product, an 
audio oscillator, in their California garage in 1939 
(Poulton, 2005). 
In summary, in this section we discuss the three logics 
underpinning Unity’s discursive framing, which we 
summarize in Table 2 below. In the next section, we 
describe how Unity developers’ affective reactions to 
such framing differ from one another and facilitate 
different configurations of power as a result of such 
differences. In so doing, we show how affect is a 
“missing variable” that can generate different power 
relations from the same discursive framing input. 
5 Moving Across Quadrants: How 
Affect Conditions Developers’ 
Buy-In  
In what follows, we will show how the framing 
dynamic in the case of Unity moves through the four 
poles of the Logics. Although strategic leaders used a 
political framing, followers may accept and act 
“politically,” by framing the technology in a new way, 
or “socially,” by protecting or restoring the social 
framing being challenged. Developers, in turn, have 
the opportunity to either blindly reject the alternative 
framing (disregarding contingency) or to accept a 
coexistence between various framings and thereby 
acknowledge contingency. 
5.1 Politico-Ideological Pole: 
Ideologically Entrenched Buy-In to 
the New Framing 
Our field data from the Unity event help to illustrate 
that affective processes were strongly implicated in 
how developers reacted to the framing of the game 
engine. Many of the game designers off-stage strongly 
identified with the “heroic” figures on-stage, 
demonstrating an overinvestment in these narratives 
similar to that of sport supporters or rock fans.  
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Figure 5. Taking Democratization Further 
Keynote speakers received a heated ovation from the 
overcrowded conference room. This overinvestment, 
which led to an enthusiastic buy-in, was also visible in 
many informal discussions during coffee breaks, such 
as a father who endorsed Unity’s democratizing 
culture somewhat literally by taking pride in his use of 
the engine to develop games in his spare time for his 
kids (he was not a professional developer). He had 
chosen and continued to use Unity because of its 
legendary reputation for ease of use (although he never 
managed to finish a game). 
Crucially, affect appears as a compelling “missing 
variable” in explaining the ideological extent of the 
strong self-identification with Richard Garriott’s story, 
which led game designers to gloss over various 
alternative critical explanations, including the fact that 
Unity was designed for mobile games and might not be 
the ideal engine to design complex role-playing games. 
For example, in Figure 5 we show a LinkedIn message 
where the CEO announces his new no-cost policy and 
“democratization strategy” in his efforts to strengthen 
users’ allegiance to the Unity engine. In this example, 
the developer responds somewhat unreflexively (or 
with tacit complicity) to the news by using a reference 
to disappointment (“we shalln’t disappoint you”) that 
is somewhat filial (i.e., worrying about disappointing a 
moral figure) and somewhat out of place in what 
should be an owner-customer relationship. 
Affect also operates at a more biographical level. As 
illustrated below, designers’ buy-in to Unity is linked 
to their identities—game designers identify with 
different professional role-models, depending on 
which platform they adopt. On-site discussions with 
game designers reveal that 3D artists self-identified 
strongly with the entrepreneurial biographical 
narrative. Several of them had quit their jobs in big 
game studios to focus on assets creation and, in 
conversation with the researcher, expressed the belief 
that the success of mobile apps favors the emergence 
of indie developers in small businesses. Typically, 
Unity’s entrepreneurial narrative sustains the figure of 
the indie developer, with which game designers 
identify strongly. Thanks to the Asset Store, the 
designer-programmer is empowered, as she or he then 
potentially “doesn’t need” a 3D artist. In the following 
extract from one of Unity’s online fora, the 
mobilization of indie developers’ affective 
vulnerability leads a game developer to take pride in 
using Unity by defining himself as a programmer and 
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by stigmatizing/demonizing the figure of the 
“modder.”4 Thus, in the words of John:5 
JOHN: Without sources, I don’t see any 
interest on [sic] UDK (Unreal Development 
Kit), you don’t have the same low level of 
access as in Unity. Sure, Unreal modders 
will be happy now. But am not a modder, 
am a game programmer. (Unity’s online 
community) 
UDK is here associated with modders using the Unreal 
engine, and thereby with the less professional and less 
legitimate role of the bricoleur (in the original 
exchange, modders are called “lowly”). The obvious 
self-identification in this example shows how Unity’s 
framing seductively reassures and secures 
programmers’ sense of skill and competence. 
Later, in the same online thread, John makes his 
observation more explicit. Claiming to acknowledge 
the perspective of the others, he actually makes fun of 
it, thus confirming the ideological stance that he is 
adopting: 
JOHN: UDK is just crap, I don't see any 
professional studio working with UDK. It 
brakes [sic] your workflow, you have to 
change your coding philosophy and cons 
are greater than pros ...  I know is fun to 
play Bioshock (wish [sic] by the way was 
made with a heavy sourced modified 
version of UE3) and say wooow i can make 
this with UDK!!! Nope, that’s not true. As 
someone already pointed out. Making 
games, sorry MODS with UDK is like 
reverse engineering all the way, all the way. 
Unity gives you the possibility to make your 
own editor extension/tools. (Unity’s online 
community) 
The tone is derisory and denigrating (“crap,” “any 
professional studio,” “MODS”). By highlighting 
reverse engineering and mods, John undermines the 
professional legitimacy of designing with UDK. He 
typically glosses over alternative explanations (“Nope, 
that’s not true”) and is clearly not attuned to 
contingency. He appears affectively bound to his own 
discourse in a way that manifests excessive buy-in. In 
summary, Unity’s strategic leaders mobilize 
“political” discourses (the idealization of the indie 
“free” developer), which are subsequently endorsed at 
a local level with different degrees of enthusiastic buy-
in (e.g., the identification with the programmer and 
demotion of the modder; the possibility of making their 
own editor extension). Leaders do so in order to 
 
4 “Modding” refers to the creation and distribution of player-
created software extensions to a game (i.e., here the first-
person shooter game Unreal, from which UDK originated), 
widely downloaded and used by players. 
encourage a form of extreme identification and 
overinvestment on the part of developers who, being 
ideologically self-invested, are affectively motivated 
to gloss over or ignore the existence of alternatives and 
who overlook the corporate interests by which Unity is 
directed, at least in part. The effect is that users are 
positioned in the top left quadrant of our Logics 
framework (see Figure 6), resulting in a strong and 
rather unquestioning buy-in to, but also an active 
championing of, their leaders’ framing of the Unity 
ecosystem—underpinned by motivations of which 
they may not be focally aware. 
5.2 Socio-Ideological Pole: Ideologically 
Entrenched Rejection of the New 
Framing  
Other developers may be more passive in their 
acceptance of the status quo, thus resisting buying into 
the proposed framing of Unity as a technology that 
could challenge the status quo and so contribute to the 
reproduction of prevailing power relations by 
continuing to enact existing processes (bottom left 
quadrant). Therefore, others may not feel affectively 
moved by the attempted framing of Unity in the manner 
of John, above. For example, in the same thread of the 
Unity online forum, Luigi, another designer, contests 
John’s self-identification (with high standards of 
professionalism) and cannot hide his contempt: 
LUIGI: That’s actually quite a failure and an 
elitist attitude. You should realize that 
working with mods and UDK is game 
programming and there is no difference 
between that and modding. I’ve worked in 
the industry for quite some time now and you 
rarely see any high-level game code in C++ 
so does that mean that every single game you 
build is modding and not programming? Of 
course not! (Unity’s online community) 
John, the ardent Unity supporter referred to above, 
appears to be (affectively) blinded to alternative 
perspectives, at least in this exchange. For example, he 
ignores that 3D artists may typically praise the aesthetic 
and technical demands of the old regime because of its 
visual quality and thus gloss over, or even contest, the 
relatively poor quality of graphics in the new Unity-
based mobile gaming generation. John’s apparent 
investment in Unity’s framing makes no impact on peers 
such as Luigi, who is himself routinely (affectively) 
absorbed in replicating his taken-for-granted practice of 
game design, here working with UDK. 
5 Names of participants in Unity’s online community have 
been changed; they have no relationship to names in real life. 
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Figure 6. Overinvestment in the Political Framing as a Result of Unity’s Discourse  
Leads to Unquestioning Buy-In 
 
Figure 7. 3D Artist Reacts to the Political Framing of Unity by Reproducing the Status Quo,  
Leading to Non-Buy-In 
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In fact, some of the game developers keep defending 
UDK’s suitability for designing first-person shooter-
type games: 
LUIGI: If you want to learn how to build an 
Unreal Tournament kind of game, then the 
UDK is perfect for that because it even 
provides the assets of the game, so you can 
go behind the scenes and discover the way 
they (Epic) did it. If you have the team (or 
excel at being a jack-of-trades) the UDK 
enables you to take advantage of the 
advanced features that can catapult your 
Indie project to AAA level. (Unity’s online 
community) 
Users of UDK like Luigi lend credence to UDK’s 
existing institutional accreditation scheme, thereby 
reproducing prevailing power relations. By using a 
scheme widely known and accepted by console game 
developers, they protect the prevailing institutional 
order. In contrast, Unity’s discourses threaten such 
users’ existing identification with UDK, producing a 
very different affective reaction. Their continued use 
of UDK predisposes them to reinforce the existing 
technical frame and to actively disregard the 
innovative potential of Unity. In response to Unity’s 
discursive maneuvers, they position themselves within 
the ideological/social dimension (see Figure 7), 
emerging as a possible obstacle or “barrier” to the 
irresistible march of Unity (at least from Unity’s 
perspective). 
5.3 Socio-Ethical Pole: 
Open/Conditional (Temporary) 
Non-Buy-In to the New Framing  
The analysis of Unity’s online community of users 
reveals that the two leading game engines, Unity and 
its competitors Unreal/UDK, were perceived as 
reproducing the line of antagonism between the 
(challenged) social logic and the new political logic. 
Whereas UDK at this point had many AAA titles, was 
industry proven, and intended for larger, specialized 
teams and bigger budgets, Unity was tailored to the 
market of mobile apps and entrepreneurs who did not 
necessarily belong to major studios. In other words, the 
success of Unity resulted from its accessibility and “no 
royalties, no fees” policy. 
However, not all game designers endorse Unity with 
the conviction demonstrated above by John. While 
important Unity actors “on stage” proactively offer an 
alternative way to follow, users “off stage” buy into the 
framing but continue to pay (some) attention to the 
contingent nature of Unity’s increasing dominance. 
Moving to the bottom right quadrant, UDK developers 
might be well aware that alternative possibilities exist 
that could successfully challenge the status quo on this 
issue within the community. For instance, Pierre, a 
participant in Unity’s online community forum, 
discloses his preference for UDK, yet carefully seeks 
to establish a fair comparison before stating his 
opinion: 
PIERRE: I am sorry but Unity isn’t the best 
FPS Engine. I think it can look as good but 
UDK has the ability to look better. UDK 
was designed for FPS whereas Unity seems, 
to me anyway, to be designed for a greater 
variety. They are both equally as great and 
amazing, I just think it comes down to 
opinion. As I have stated mine. And don’t 
take me for some Unity basher—I love 
Unity. But let’s face it, UDK is a 
commercial-grade game engine with many 
AAA titles under its belt. It’s industry-
proven and intended for larger specialized 
teams and bigger budgets. Unity is 
primarily a casual / web game engine 
intended for smaller teams. Both can make 
fun games, but it’s apples and oranges, and 
trying to directly compare the two feature to 
feature is unfair to them both. (Unity’s 
online community) 
In this quote, the developer is concerned with fairness, 
maintaining a balanced judgment, and being respectful 
of the quality of each perspective. He relativizes his 
own affective stance toward UDK’s engine: “it comes 
down to opinion.” He is neither a “basher,” 
overinvested in denigrating, nor a fanatic adopter; he 
defends his opinion in a manner that is attentive to 
contingency. His opinion is, therefore, both strong and 
consequential: “let’s face it.” By performing a 
comparison in balancing the positive and negative 
features of each, Pierre demonstrates his attention to 
contingency, yet decides not to “rock the boat.” It 
seems to us that Pierre is perfectly aware of Unity’s 
limitations, yet rationally accepts Unity for what it is: 
a cheap and accessible generalist engine. Using the 
Logics framework, his position can be described as 
socio-ethical (see Figure 8). As we explain above, 
“ethical” here refers to openness to contingencies and 
discursive conditions of possibility. In such cases, the 
actors reproduce prevailing power relations, but 
moderate their buy-in to the Unreal engine, yielding a 
potentially new relation to it. Unlike the two extreme 
positions described above, locating oneself in this 
affective positioning is likely to generate a possibly 
temporary non-buy-in or a conditional buy-in 
governed by a mix of affective, material, and practical 
considerations. Affect continues to play a critical role 
but does not feature as prominently as in the two 
previous cases.
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Figure 8. Developers Are Aware of Alternatives, Leading to Temporary Non-Buy-In (“Wait And See”)  
or a Nonexclusive Buy-In (“Horses for Courses”) 
 
Figure 9. The Diversity of Unity Is Framed in a More Ethical Way, Promoting a Conditional Buy-In 
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5.4 Politico-Ethical Pole: 
Open/Conditional Buy-In to the 
New Framing  
Finally, it is important to note that the perspective of 
everybody within the Unity community was shaped by 
each individual’s own psychosocial positioning toward 
discourse and associated ideology about technology—
even though members were actively shaping and 
framing these things for others. In this example, Unity 
CEO Helgason assumes a more ethically aware 
orientation and challenges the status quo (what we call 
here “taking a political stance”) in a way that is more 
attentive to contingency and possibilities and less 
affectively self-invested. This is observable, for 
example, in a press interview by Unity CEO Helgason, 
who confirms that 2006 was the moment of a shift in 
Unity’s strategic framing: 
We didn’t think about mobile until 2006 and 
then the Nintendo Wii came out, which we 
decided to go to for two reasons. We 
thought it would be a really open platform 
and it turned out to not be as open as we’d 
hoped. When they spoke of “indies” they 
weren’t lying, they just had a very different 
definition of indies than we had. (Online 
interview with Unity’s CEO on 
www.gamesindustry.biz) 
The CEO is using a more ethical framing to promote 
the figure of the indie developers and induce (and 
partially seduce) this specific group within Unity’s 
fold. In so doing, he indirectly talks to, and in the 
process discursively constructs, a specific occupational 
category: the indie developers working in small teams, 
whom he contrasts with established developers 
working in big firms. He not only targets indie 
developers’ affective investment in a particular way of 
seeing themselves, but also manifests his awareness of 
negotiating with alternative positioning and underlying 
interests. He does this by imaginarily occupying the 
role of a trusting designer (“we thought it would be a 
really open platform”). However, he progressively 
contests this social logic by attributing an alternative 
meaning (“very different definition”) to being indie, 
relabeling or reframing their work practice in a way 
that tends to dismiss traditional game design as a 
closed practice (“not be as open”), one that is open only 
to institutionalized developers. 
In so doing, Helgason historicizes the strategic turn of 
his company and his decision to differentiate his 
activity from traditional institutions (Nintendo) and the 
established formats (Wii) of the console market. The 
euphemism “they were not lying” reveals his 
awareness of negotiating with existing power relations 
with major actors in the field. Therefore, the CEO 
challenges the prevailing power relationship, yet 
remains sensitive to the contingency of his positioning. 
In other terms, he carefully weighs the evidence on 
both sides before choosing to challenge Nintendo’s 
view. He positions himself in the political-ethical 
quadrant (see Figure 9) and invites others to do the 
same. Ideology is still at work: the attempt to promote 
allegiance to Unity through affective identification 
with the practice of the indie developer and its 
association with novelty, freedom, and democracy is 
still in operation. However, this maneuver is tempered 
by Helgason’s own positioning: his openness to 
different points of view, his acknowledgment of a 
plurality of options, and the implicit recognition that 
the position of Unity is contingent (what we call above 
an ethical orientation). Actors occupying this position 
are still likely to endorse Unity, but in a more open, 
realistic, and possibly conditional way. 
6 Discussion 
In this paper, we argue that affect is both a medium 
through which political battles over emerging 
technologies are fought, as well as a critical component 
in promoting buy-in to one technological framing over 
others. Using data from the Unity ecosystem, we 
suggest that organizational actors’ affective buy-in to 
specific ideological framing of technology has had a 
strong influence on their relative propensity to jump on 
the bandwagon of a new emerging technology 
(reciprocally, previous engagements with gaming 
platforms are also likely to inform such ideological 
framing). In short, the framing of and buy-in to Unity 
3D were both affectively conditioned and promoted 
through the strategic mobilization of specific 
ideological discourses as well as the intentional and 
unintentional exploitation of affective vulnerabilities 
on the part of developers. We say “intentionally” and 
“unintentionally” because, based on our field work, we 
exemplify how, for example, Unity’s CEO, an ex-
developer himself, was infused with the same ideals 
and entangled in the same web of affective 
identification within which he sought to enroll others. 
We argue in particular that the rational institutional 
discourse surrounding the shift of Unity 3D from 
“fringe” to “mainstream” technology was animated 
and underpinned by Unity developers’ differing 
affective identifications with the technical possibilities 
of the newly positioned engine and its association with 
the affectively laden notion of freedom and 
nonconformity. Such an acknowledgment holds the 
clear methodological implication that accounts by 
respondents of institutional dynamics are not to be 
trusted at face value by researchers, as they are likely 
to include unacknowledged semi/unconscious 
motivations and fantasmatic narratives. Having said 
that, platform economics and dynamics are much more 
complicated, and reducing such a positive market 
effect to the power of marketing buzzwords or 
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organizing visions would be oversimplistic. It is clear 
that the dynamics of digital platform operations go 
well beyond the rhetorical framing; not all of the 
answer lies in the affective contagion and collective 
dynamics of buy-in that trigger the diffusion of 
technology within a two-sided market. 
As illustrated by the Unity 3D case, the construct of buy-
in is especially promising in the context of the growth of 
new, online forms of organizing (Winter et al., 2014), 
whose communities of actors play a pivotal role in 
helping to determine whether such ecosystems “go 
mainstream” or not. Furthermore, our framework is 
especially useful because it problematizes more 
traditional accounts of framing as primarily 
sociocognitive and sociopolitical by showing very 
explicitly how making the assumption of preexisting 
group memberships comprised of more, or less, rational 
actors might lead to errors in our thinking. In contrast, 
the Unity case shows that group dynamics are the locus 
of a dialectical and performative movement between 
contingent framings, on the one hand, and collective acts 
of affective buy-in that reinforce or transform those 
contingent framings, on the other. Our “affective 
politics” approach highlights the affective dimension 
that operates behind the institutional (Berente & Yoo, 
2012), strategic (Kaplan, 2008) or ideological 
motivations (Barrett et al., 2013). Attentiveness to 
affective politics in technology framing helps to avoid 
granting too much importance to the role of personal 
agency (i.e., the influence of strategists over their 
audience) or institutional rationality (i.e., where 
motivation is linked to institutional pressure rather than 
more informal motivations). While framings may be in 
opposition, (Robey & Boudreau, 1999) fantasmatic 
logic provides them with the necessary force to prevail 
and to potentially have long-lasting impact. 
Through four configurations of the Logics, we thus 
demonstrate how stakeholders involved in a particular 
technology may differentially respond to and position 
themselves relative to technological buy-in on the basis 
of more than just traditionally recognized cognitive 
analysis. Affect is thus seen to be involved in 
identification with or rejection of new technological 
framings, as actors’ orientation toward technology and 
resulting power relations emerge from the dialogue 
between ontic and ontological dimensions—a dialogue 
that may be informed by other factors, including the 
attraction of alternative framings, previous experience, 
present historical conditions, and many other factors. 
Indeed, each of our quadrants admits a number of 
different positions and degrees within them, thus 
suggesting that different ways to solve the tension 
between alternative logics and different personal 
affective compromises are available to actors. 
Moreover, the framework suggests that the positioning 
of the actors in the quadrants is likely to change over 
time: “conversions” represent a clear example of how 
framings can suddenly be reversed, based on part-
affective rather than purely cognitive motivations. 
Although the above discussion prevents us from 
establishing a normative relationship between positions 
in the quadrant and any predictive propensity toward 
buy-in to a new technology, we can hypothesize that 
different solutions to the ontic-ontological dialogue and 
the varying degrees of hold that fantasmatic logic has on 
actors’ resulting self-identifications can result in them 
experiencing different orientations toward the new 
technology (following Glynos and Howarth, we have 
termed “fantasmatic” the logic that supplies the affective 
motivation to reproduce social logics or to challenge 
these through political orientation). We summarize 
these various configurations of Logics in Figure 10 
below. 
Actors who find themselves affectively located toward 
the politico-ideological pole, for example, are likely to 
enthusiastically and unreservedly buy into the new 
framing. Indeed, they are likely to become fervent 
supporters and die-hard promoters of what they perceive 
as a just cause, not unlike John in our discussion above. 
They are also likely to persevere in using the technology, 
which, in time, will become intimately associated with 
how they see themselves. The strong ideological nature 
of this position means that these users are likely to be 
locked into this position by all manner of confirmation 
biases (Klayman, 1995). This, in turn, will make their 
position affectively entrenched, with the result that 
change may become difficult and unlikely. As sudden 
and powerfully motivated as such buy-in may be, this 
kind of early acceptance (or adhesion to the hype) also 
carries with it its own dangers of challenge (as illustrated 
by Luigi in our data), disillusionment, and frustration 
(Glynos, 2008). 
A similar but symmetrically opposite situation is likely 
to occur for actors who unconsciously reject and resist 
efforts of affective identification and who end up 
occupying different positions in the socio-ideological 
pole. As is the case with those who ideologically 
embrace the new framing, this group is likely to be 
impermeable to rational argument and slow to change 
position. As we have explained above, we do not regard 
the quadrants in Figure 10 as immutable orientations 
associated with personality traits of individuals, but 
rather as positions that actors find themselves occupying 
in the dynamics between investment and detachment. 
Accordingly, the framework envisages that, in time, 
actors may and will move within and between quadrants 
or shift to another technology altogether when new 
options and discourses become available. Analogously, 
we do not exclude the possibility of sudden shifts 
between quadrants through radical conversion 
(Moscovici, 1980). 
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Figure 10. Configurations of Logics and Associated Orientation Toward Buy-In 
Actors who occupy the socio-ethical or politico-ethical 
poles are likely to be more open to alternatives and 
therefore may identify with (or refrain from using) the 
technology in a more conditional way. Thus, we use 
the term “conditional buy-in” to signal that such 
adhesion will be subject to conditions, deliberation, 
and material calculations. One may formulate the 
hypothesis, which will need to be empirically 
corroborated, that ethically oriented identification 
(Quadrant 4) is more likely to lead to a sustainable, 
dynamic and innovative transformation that may be 
less ideologically self-invested. By contrast, we 
conjecture that ideologically invested identifications 
are more likely to lead to frustration and 
disappointment in regard to their fantasmatic 
expectations. We must emphasize, however, that these 
two positions are not affect free. For one thing, as we 
have seen, promoters of new technologies circulate 
specific discourses aimed at enrolling (or seducing) the 
occupants of these more ethically oriented positions. 
Simultaneously, in both cases, actors accept being 
identified by the categories and grammar proposed by 
the new technology (programmer, modder, developer, 
indie, open person, etc.) This means that the working 
of fantasmatic logic mediates but does not eliminate 
the dialogue between the ontic and ontological 
dimensions, so affect continues to play a central role in 
this process. 
Our tentative framework is of potentially real value not 
only for addressing affective motivations for 
embracing one technological framing over another but 
also for understanding actors’ various degrees of 
engagement toward such framings. A more effective 
integration of affective dynamics into the buy-in 
process enhances the level of achievable granularity, 
enabling a better appreciation of the phenomenon. 
This paper also advances conversations with, as well 
as within, other approaches to the study of affective 
politics in IS, including phenomenological, 
psychodynamic, and Foucauldian orientations 
(Hirschhorn, 1988; Avgerou & McGrath, 2005; 
Brigham & Introna, 2006). We have suggested, in fact, 
that affect cannot be treated in isolation and studied as 
a mode of being or a mental state of IS stakeholders. 
Rather, as outlined above, much is to be gained if we 
adopt a politically informed stance; accordingly, we 
consider affect as both the arena in which ideological 
conflicts between alternative paradigms are conducted 
as well as the medium through which such conflicts are 
fought and temporarily resolved. As a result, our core 
focus on affective politics contributes to earlier 
discussions on why “social defenses” (Wastell, 1996, 
1999) emerge (the “barrier” of IS design and framing) 
or, contrastingly, why disruptive innovation happens to 
thrive so suddenly. 
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Perhaps more fundamentally, we have also made the 
case that a Logics approach provides a useful analytical 
framework to connect the areas of affect, meaning-
making, and power relations. While earlier studies on 
performative framing and power have drawn on actor-
network theory (Walsham, 1997; Monteiro, 2000; 
Cecez-Kecmanovic et al., 2014), the Logics 
framework allows us to reach beyond the empirically 
visible ontic dimension, where power relations can be 
described as resulting from decisions and deliberation, 
in order to give explicit consideration to the less 
immediately visible, affectively mediated ontological 
dimension of practice. As we have seen above, this is 
the dimension in which a platform’s owners and 
developers simply find themselves having a strong 
feeling for one technology over another, a feeling that 
they often verbalize with strong words and passionate 
expressions. Our main contribution to the literature 
addressing narratives and subjective interpretations 
(e.g., Bartis and Mitev 2008; Fincham 2002) is thus to 
engage with fantasmatic logic, which explains why 
certain framings become suddenly excitable, gripping, 
or repellent within a group. 
The Logics approach and the four quadrants 
framework are also useful in understanding and 
depicting the power relations that may potentially be 
obtained by mobilizing different forms of affective 
buy-in. Thus, this approach can help to make sense of 
the varying degrees of power exerted by stakeholders 
or promoters when implementing an information 
system (Boonstra, Boddy, & Bell, 2008; Pouloudi et al. 
2016). While our framework holds similarities with the 
Foucauldian tradition (Silva & Backhouse, 2003; 
Avgerou & McGrath, 2007), attending to the 
fantasmatic dimension enables us to move beyond 
regulatory power by capturing and commenting upon 
power’s emergent, prediscursive, and affective 
dynamics. Deployment of the Logics, in particular, 
suggests that the relationship between affect and 
technology framing cannot simply be reduced to a 
linear cause-effect matter. For one thing, as we have 
seen, attempts to promote affective identification with 
a specific practice can have different and potentially 
opposing outcomes. 
7 Conclusion 
Our paper engages not only theoretically but also 
epistemologically and empirically with the notion of 
affective politics in the context of technology framing 
and buy-in. Acknowledging that the process through 
which people consent to the framing of (the nature) of 
technology has been little understood, our core 
contribution is thus to introduce social, political, and 
fantasmatic logics to the IS literature in order to 
develop a more granular understanding of technology 
framing and buy-in. We contribute specifically to the 
technology framing literature—especially the 
sociocognitive and sociopolitical areas—by showing 
that collective meaning-making always emerges out of 
an antagonism that impels social actors and interest 
groups to position themselves according to four poles: 
this process is inescapably political and, relatedly, 
fundamentally intersubjective and collective. In this 
paper, we offer a framework that helps to identify four 
ideal positions that result from the dynamic between 
these poles and exemplify them systematically using 
examples from our empirical study of Unity 3D. 
We contribute to the existing literature on technology 
framing in a number of ways. First, we propose a 
politico-affective understanding of framing 
incongruence that complements and integrates with the 
prevailing sociocognitive view. Our argument is that 
affective politics is constitutively involved in the 
construction of, negotiation of, and buy-in to such 
framing. At the same time, conflict and incongruence 
between framing are experienced affectively as a threat 
to self-identification and leads to responses that are 
partially emotionally driven (and so apparently 
“irrational”). Second, our paper integrates the 
performative view of framing, suggesting that the 
politicization of “meaning power” is often and 
possibly always underpinned by the attempt to 
mobilize both reason and affect. While interests, 
pursuit of legitimation, and the search for material 
returns remain central motivators in the framing of 
technology, one should not discount the power of 
seduction and enrollment through the invocation of 
affective associations with specific discourses (in our 
case, discourse of community, heroism, and 
antiestablishment). Third, our framework 
problematizes the tacit assumption of uniformity and 
consensus that underpins much of the existing 
discussion of framing as group- or occupational-
related phenomena. 
Our approach and framework, as exemplified in Figure 
10, suggests that a plurality of positions exist within 
what authors have often characterized as homogenous 
groups. The framework also makes room for 
movement, transitions, and compromises, providing a 
much more nuanced and realistic vista on the political 
dynamics of technology framing. One of the strengths 
of our framework is that the focus is not on 
psychological individuals: the framework identifies 
modes of engagement and positions rather than 
individual emotional reactions. The framework thus 
operates at a psychosocial rather than psychological 
level. At this level, technological frames are not “done 
deals” and their grip depends in part on the extent to 
which actors continue to self-identify with them. In 
line with the Essex School (Laclau, 1993), the 
framework shows that “agency” is always a possibility 
that can emerge at the intersection between old and 
new discourses: in a few years, for example, John may 
find that people call him a “conservative” for using 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
925 
Unity, which in turn may affect his allegiance to the 
whole ecosystem. 
Being speculative in character, our theory-building 
paper opens up a number of opportunities for future 
research. For reasons of space, we confine ourselves to 
listing the three more apparent routes. First, to our 
knowledge, this is the first attempt to use and develop 
the Logics approach in the IS discipline—in this case, 
by focusing illustratively on design framing processes. 
However, more work is necessary to fully exploit the 
affordances of this approach. For example, we have 
mobilized our Unity case alongside our theoretical 
exposition for explicitly explicatory purposes; much 
could be learned by conducting further empirical 
studies in different contexts and cases to shed light on 
the discursive maneuvers—be they conscious or 
semiconscious—used by technology designers and 
leaders and the responses of those targeted. Future 
studies could also explore in more detail the types of 
discourse used and their effectiveness in inducing buy-
in to the emerging technology. Second, our framework 
explicitly hypothesizes that positions will change over 
time and more work is necessary to examine this 
variation; in particular, longitudinal and historical case 
studies would enable us to deepen our understanding 
of the temporal dynamics of the Logics. 
Third, in the discussion part of the paper, we propose 
a quadrant for conceptualizing actors’ orientations 
toward technological framing, a framework that 
requires further elaboration and needs to be 
corroborated. We suggest that our framework may 
offer a useful complement to emerging performative 
approaches within IS (Cecez-Kecmanovic et al., 2014) 
that seek to highlight the inherent indeterminacy of 
technology success and failure and address the 
“agencies of assessment” that perform IS realities over 
time. While, for example, we welcome these authors’ 
efforts to expose the “ontological politics” entailed in 
attempts to promote competing assessments of IS, such 
studies to date have largely omitted the affective 
dimension through which such narratives are filtered 
before they can be performed in practice. Thus, 
recalling Kaplan (2008), a more sophisticated account 
of the mediating role of affect in the framing-adhesion 
process offers real promise in enhancing existing 
performative accounts to explain why certain 
ideologies may be inherently more seductive and 
powerful for some people than for others and why one 
frame may come to predominate over others. Finally, 
and crucially, we hope that others may take and use the 
Logics framework to enrich this and other practice-
based perspectives on the framing, acceptance, and 
implementation/adoption of IS. 
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Appendix A. Details About Secondary Streams of the Literature Review 
Relevant sections 
of the review 
Research streams 
(and explanations) 
References 
The sociopolitics 
of framing 
The Irvine School of social informatics 
The incorporation of politics in the context of meaning-making 
has a long tradition within the IS literature and dates back more 
than 40 years to, at least, the Irvine School in the late 70s and 
80s. This pioneering work brought to the fore the social 
dimensions of informatics. For instance, the Irvine School was 
concerned with the appropriation of IT by nonspecialists, 
highlighting ideological assumptions and biases within the 
computer science community itself. Information and 
communication technology itself has been considered as an 
institutional actor and IS implementation as a process of design 
and institutionalization, which captures the value-laden process 
through which struggles between various interest groups become 
embedded in the way things are done—often with lasting impact. 
Kraemer & Dutton, 1979 
Danziger et al., 1982 
Kling & Iacono, 1989 
Kling, 1996 
Kling, 2004 
 
 The circuits-of-power framework  
The sociopolitics 
of framing 
 
Group motivations 
 
Affective politics  
Institutionalization of IS is achieved when the system is no 
longer contested and therefore becomes routinized in the 
organization. From this perspective, power is not the capacity of 
an individual agent but results instead from the circulation of 
discourse and disciplinary techniques; it is fundamentally 
strategic, intentional, and central in sustaining and conferring 
stability within social systems. For an information system to be 
institutionalized, it has to be integrated into three circuits of 
power: episodic (the “power over,” foregrounding the relations 
between those who promote the systems and those who resist), 
social (dispositional power including rules and norms, and their 
relationship to technology) and systemic (facilitative power: 
techniques used to ensure discipline and hegemony). 
Clegg, 1989 
Silva & Backhouse, 2003 
 
 The IS literature on affect/feelings/emotions  
Affective politics  While affect is arguably central to human motivation, it is still 
poorly understood theoretically. Its analysis is often complicated 
by the numerous synonyms of the notion in psychology and 
social sciences. 
The Logics framework explains the unfolding interplay between 
three key dimensions of psychosociality: “affect”—subjects’ 
unconscious, prelinguistic positioning and associated 
receptiveness to feelings (Massumi, 1987); “feelings”—
sensations resulting from subjects’ affectively shaped 
interpreting and labeling of phenomena based on their own 
biographically derived understandings of their situation; and 
collective “emotions”—socially embedded, and socially 
experienced, displays of feelings. A common example of the 
social embeddedness of emotions would be the experience of 
shame. 
To recap, “affect” relates to our unconscious and prelinguistic 
receptiveness, and thus predispositions toward ideas or 
experiences; “feelings” are biographically derived interpretations 
of our positioning in relation to these ideas/experiences; and 
“emotions” are social performances that are collectively 
experienced. 
Beaudry & Pinsonneault, 2005 
Ortiz de Guinea & Markus, 2009 
Zhang, 2013 
Stein et al., 2015 
Ashkanasy, Humphrey, & Huy, 
2017 
 
The technology acceptance model (TAM) 
Most of the published work in IS on emotions, including the vast 
TAM-related literature, relies on questionnaires and focuses on 
the individual level and generally raises questions that are 
different from those we address in this paper. 
Davis, 1989 
Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989 
Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1992 
Agarwal & Karahanna, 2000 
Venkatesh, Thong, & Xu, 2012, etc. 
Affective Politics and Technology Buy-In  
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Appendix B. Details About the Study on Unity 3D (Generated September 
2012-December 2013) 
Methods Source of data and activities 
Ethnography of Unity’s annual developer conference, 
Unite 2013, at the Vancouver Convention Center. 
Sensitization to peoples’ affect and feelings was achieved 
via participant observation of speeches, parties, and 
celebrations, as well as through speaking with developers. 
Participant observation of numerous events, including 
game design meetings in two start-ups, a specialized 
research conference in the field of game design research 
in Bournemouth in the United Kingdom in 2013 
15 conferences, tutorials and workshops were attended, which 
included: “Unity Serious Games’ Showcase,” “Console to 
Mobile: Bringing AAA to mobile,” “Scripting behind the Scene,” 
“Connect Gamers Cross Platforms with Facebook,” and 
“Architectural Visualization with Unity: From Revit to Unity to 
Rift” 
The observations were written up as ethnographic field notes and 
ethnographic memos. 
Netography of Unity’s online community of users, 
reflecting prior research on online communities in IS 
(Koh, et al., 2007; Wilson & Peterson, 2002; Zhang & 
Storck, 2001; Vaast & Levina, 2015). 
To collect threads, the field researcher relied upon the search 
functions of the online fora for certain keywords, such as “UDK” 
(Unreal development kit), “Unreal,” “Unity,” “First-person 
shooter,” and “RPG” (Role-playing game). 
The following conversation was examined in depth: “Is Unity any 
easier than UDK?” We chose this (heated) exchange as it 
compares Unity’s framing with that of a competitor (UDK-
Unreal), and illustrates how developers position themselves in 
relation to two market-leading game engines. Through Unity’s 
online community, participants obtain help and discuss solutions 
with experienced users of Unity. They share their knowledge of, 
and passion for, the topic. 
The online community’s sections encompass fora, answers, 
feedback, an issues tracker, and documentation, Unify Script, 
Tips Wiki and Unity Chat. These fora are the central hub of the 
community discussions. Game designers are invited to voice their 
opinions, display what they are working on and to evaluate the 
work others are doing. The fora are also an opportunity to 
network with other Unity developers if members need to build or 
expand their teams. 
Interviewees as well as fora participants were anonymized. 
A three-hour in-depth interview with Unity 3D’s director 
of its UK branch and the director of support and 
communication was conducted at Unity’s office in 
Brighton in 2013. 
Unity’s support team aims at understanding the problems that 
customers have and ensuring that they receive technical solutions 
and attention from Unity’s developers if they find bugs. 
Documentary research on Unity 3D Recorded speeches, press, and online interviews of the CEO 
David Helgason were analyzed, and documents as well as 
archival analysis were conducted (e.g., blog posts, white papers, 
websites and Unity’s marketing materials). 
We also followed the LinkedIn activities and announcements of 
the company. 
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